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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Penry v. Lynaugh 1 
to hear the case of Johnny Paul Penry, a mild to moderately re-
tarded young man who has been sentenced to death for first degree 
murder. By his own admission, Johnny Paul Penry was convicted 
of the murder of Pamela Carpenter who had been "beaten, raped 
and stabbed with a pair of scissors in her own home."2 In addition 
to Penry's admitted guilt to this brutal murder, however, was evi-
dence that Penry, who was twenty-three years old at the time of the 
offense, has the mind and the emotional development of a six or 
1 Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988) 
(No. 87-6177). 
2832 F.2d at 917. 
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seven year-old child. 3 Defense counsel also presented substantial 
evidence that Penry had been adversely affected by an abnormal 
childhood.4 The 258th District Court of Trinity County, Texas sum-
marized the evidence as follows: 
As a telling example of his mental deficiency petitioner refers 
to the fact that working daily with his aunt, it still required a 
year to teach him how to write his name .... There was evi-
dence suggesting he was frequently and severly [sic] beaten by 
his mother, spent much of his childhood in state schools, and 
in his teens was victimized by other men who treated him like 
a slave.5 
Despite this evidence, the jury imposed the death penalty. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.6 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari on two constitutional issues.7 First, the 
Court will consider whether the execution of any mentally retarded 
defendant is invariably cruel and unusual under the eighth amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution. Second, the Court will determine 
whether the Texas death penalty statute imposes unconstitutional 
restraints on jury discretion in sentencing, preventing the Penry jury 
from considering Penry's mental retardation as a mitigating factor. 
This Note suggests that the Court should reverse Johnny Paul 
Penry's death sentence by holding that the application of the Texas 
statute in Penry was unconstitutional. If the Court finds that the 
jury was not statutorily constrained from weighing Penry's mental 
retardation as a mitigating factor, the Court must address the pro-
priety of his death sentence. Current authority suggests that Penry's 
sentence is not invalid under the eighth amendment. 
This Note examines the appropriateness of executing mentally 
retarded defendants in the context of the Penry appeal. Section II 
summarizes the issues presented on appeal in Penry v. Lynaugh. This 
section evaluates Penry's claims by analyzing the Fifth Circuit's de-
cision and by presenting the arguments on appeal against the back-
ground of current law. This section proposes that, when evaluated 
in terms of recognized social goals of punishment, the execution of 
mentally retarded defendants is not inherently cruel and unusual. 
Section II also concludes, however, that the Texas death penalty 
3 Brief for Petitioner at 6, Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 
108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988) (No. 87-6177). 
4 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 7; see 832 F.2d at 917. 
5Id. at 6. 
6832 F.2d at 926. 
7 108 S. Ct. at 2896; 57 U.S.L.W. 3014 (U.S. Aug. 12, 1988). 
1989] MENTALLY RETARDED DEFENDANTS 325 
statute effectively denied Johnny Paul Penry a fair sentencing de-
termination, thus invalidating his death sentence. Section III dis-
cusses the treatment of mentally retarded defendants in the com-
petency and culpability phases of criminal trials. This section 
considers whether mentally retarded defendants are given a fair 
opportunity to raise the issue of their mental disability at trial. 
Mentally retarded individuals' mental abilities are often not suffi-
ciently impaired to render them legally incompetent and thus in-
capable of being found guilty. It is therefore essential that the 
mentally retarded be permitted to introduce their mental disability 
as a factor mitigating against harsh punishment. 
Sections IV and V of the Note examine whether the mentally 
retarded should receive special consideration based on their dis-
ability. These sections refer to the criminal justice system's approach 
to juveniles and the mentally ill as possible models for prosecuting 
mentally retarded offenders. Section IV compares and contrasts 
juveniles and mentally retarded individuals. These groups are sim-
ilar in intellectual maturity and emotional development. Age and 
mental ability are factors which courts have consistently recognized 
as justification for differential treatment of these two groups. Thus, 
the Court in Penry may rely, by analogy, on the criminal justice 
system's treatment of juveniles to support a reversal of Penry's death 
sentence. The law does not completely excuse criminal conduct 
committed by these types of offenders, however, and the Court is 
unlikely to do so now. 
Section V analyzes the application of evaluative standards de-
veloped for mentally ill offenders to mentally retarded defendants. 
Mental illness and mental retardation may be treated similarly be-
cause they both involve impaired mental states. The professional 
community, however, has adamantly claimed that mental retarda-
tion should not be treated as a form of mental illness. In addition, 
laws that allow mentally ill offenders to be removed from criminal 
proceedings and thus to avoid conviction and punishment have 
been widely criticized. Thus, the mental illness model is not likely 
to be expanded in Penry to include mental retardation. 
II. THE PENRY ApPEAL 
Johnny Paul Penry, a mentally retarded person with an IQ in 
the range of 50-63,8 challenges his death penalty conviction before 
8 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 46. Various documents examined at the competency 
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the Supreme Court. His appeal rests on two arguments. First, Penry 
argues that it is cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth 
amendment to execute a mentally retarded person. Second, Penry 
challenges the Texas sentencing statute and the jury instructions at 
his own trial under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Penry 
argues that the application of the statute in his case did not let the 
jury "in on the secret" that Penry's mental retardation could be 
considered as a mitigating factor in determining his sentence.9 
Amici curiae10 filed on behalf of petitioner believe that Penry is 
entitled to a reversal based on the inadequacy of the Texas statute. 11 
The brief, however, is limited to the issue of executing mentally 
retarded defendants. 12 
A. The Propriety of a Death Sentence in Penry 
The most controversial of the two issues presented for review 
is whether it is cruel and unusual to execute an individual with the 
reasoning capacity of a seven year-old. 13 The eighth amendment 
hearing placed defendant Johnny Paul Penry's IQ at 51, 54, 56 and 63. Id. at 42-48. Dr. 
Jerome Brown, Ph.D., who examined Penry prior to testifying as an expert at trial, diagnosed 
Penry as having an IQ of 54. Id. at 46. The levels of retardation have been classified as 
"mild," "moderate," "severe" and "profound." AMERICAN ASS'N ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, 
CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION (H. Grossman ed. 1983) [hereinafter AAMD]. 
957 U.S.L.w. 3505 (Feb. 7, 1989). 
!O Amici curiae in support of petitioner consist of eleven professional organizations: 
American Association on Mental Retardation, American Psychological Association, Associa-
tion for Retarded Citizens of the United States, Association for Persons with Severe Handi-
caps, American Association of University Affiliated Programs for the Developmentally Dis-
abled, American Orthopsychiatric Association, New York State Association for Retarded 
Children, Inc., National Association of Private Residential Resources, National Association 
of Superintendents of Public Residential Facilities for the Mentally Retarded, Mental Health 
Law Project, and National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems. 
II Amici curiae for Petitioner at 4, Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, cert. granted, 108 S. 
Ct. 2896 (No. 87-6177) [hereinafter Amici]. 
12 !d. 
13 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at i. Assigning a mental age to a retarded individual 
attempts to describe the severity of the disability by comparing the retarded individual's 
intelligence with that of a "mentally typical" person. See J. Ellis & R. Luckasson, Mentally 
Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 434 n.105 (1985) (Symposium: 
ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards) [hereinafter Ellis]. 
Penry argues that he, who has a seven year-old's reasoning ability, should not be executed. 
In oral arguments before the Supreme Court, counsel for Penry stated that while every 
degree of mental retardation should not be disqualified from the death penalty, the line 
should be drawn at a defendant with Penry's abilities. 57 U.S.L.W. at 3505. Evidence offered 
in support of this argument, however, shows that the execution of any mentally retarded 
defendant should be prohibited. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 49. This is the position 
taken by Amici, and is the issue which this Note will analyze. 
1989] MENTALLY RETARDED DEFENDANTS 327 
prohibits imposing cruel and unusual punishments upon criminal 
defendants. 14 It has fallen to the courts to define what constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment. 15 The Supreme Court has held that 
imposition of a death penalty upon a convicted defendant is not 
inherently cruel and unusual. 16 The Court has, however, imposed 
certain restrictions as to which offenses may be punishable by a 
death sentenceY In making this determination, the Supreme Court 
in Penry will likely look at three factors that it recognizes as indicative 
of the propriety of capital punishment. These factors are societal 
consensus, retribution and deterrence. IS 
The existence of a societal consensus regarding executing men-
tally retarded defendants will be most persuasive to the Court. 19 
Although public opinion concerning the death penalty has been 
variously documented over the years, the most objective evidence 
reflecting society's attitude is provided by legislation and court de-
cisions. These indicia reflect society's recognition that the mentally 
retarded should be treated as normal adults. If they are to receive 
the benefits and privileges accorded to people of normal intelli-
gence, mentally retarded people should also be expected to abide 
by society's rules and reap the consequences of their infractions. 
14 The text of the eighth amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. 
VIII. 
15 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2698 (1988); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584,591-92 (1977). 
16 "It is now well settled that the death penalty is not invariably cruel and unusual within 
the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; it is not inherently barbaric or an unacceptable 
mode of punishment for crime." Coker, 433 U.S. at 591. 
17 A death sentence imposed on a defendant convicted of rape was held to be excessive 
punishment because the crime of rape does not involve the death of the victim. [d. at 598. 
The death penalty, when imposed for an offense of murder, was deemed acceptable because 
the punishment was proportionate to the severity of the crime. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 187 (1976). The emphasis on proportionality is reflected in all state statutes that autho-
rize the death penalty. See e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-602 (1987) (death penalty authorized 
for persons charged with capital murder); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 4209 (1974 & Supp. 
1987) (death penalty authorized for persons convicted of first degree murder); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 775.082 (1976 & Supp. 1989) (death penalty authorized for person convicted of a 
capital felony); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-29-9 (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1988) (state may seek 
death sentence for murder); cf Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (defendants con-
victed of felony murder could not receive the death penalty where they did not participate 
in the killing). But see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (defendants convicted of felony 
murder who did not participate in the killing could receive a death sentence where their 
criminal activity exhibited a reckless disregard for human life). 
18 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2691-92; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-83. 
19 This conclusion is based on the Court's reasoning in Thompson, in which the Court 
granted a blanket exclusion for all defendants under the age of sixteen based primarily on 
public opinion reflected in state legislation. 108 S. Ct. at 2692-96. 
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1. Society's Attitude Toward Capital Punishment for Mentally 
Retarded Defendants 
In determining which punishments society deems acceptable, 
courts look to history and present practices, legislative determina-
tions, and the response of juries.20 An examination of these factors 
is the only reliable means of measuring the "evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."21 Public 
opinion about the abilities of the mentally retarded does not indicate 
that a societal consensus against their execution exists. 
Society's attitude toward the mentally retarded individual has 
come full circle, evolving from a policy which segregated the men-
tally retarded by involuntary institutionalization to a policy that 
seeks to incorporate the mentally retarded into normal life activi-
ties. 22 Legal reactions to this change in social attitude have been 
inconsistent, but still broadly reflect this attitudinal shift. Legislation, 
although not altogether discounting mental retardation as a dis-
ability, recognizes that some mentally retarded individuals can func-
tion normally. A few states have adopted statutes that grant mentally 
retarded individuals the right to vote under certain conditions.23 
Some states allow motor vehicle driving privileges to mentally re-
tarded individuals. 24 Judicial responses to the special characteristics 
of mentally retarded individuals have progressed in a similar fash-
ion. Courts recognize that not all mentally retarded people are 
incapable of entering into valid contracts or conveying property.25 
20 Coker, 433 U.S. at 592. 
21 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 10 1 (1958). The acceptability of a punishment should be 
measured by its use, not its availability, for even though it may be available, it nonetheless 
may be so offensive to public attitudes that it will never be given out. Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2692 n.7 
(the punishment should be measured by the frequency of its occurrence or the magnitude 
of its acceptance). 
22 Parry, Rights and Entitlements in the Community, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE 
LAW 607, 616-19 (1985) [hereinafter THE MENTALLY DISABLED]. Because mental retardation 
is not an illness and therefore not "curable," treatment of the disability has focused on 
"normalization," a model for habilitating a mentally retarded individual that stresses learning 
and implementing life skills.ld. at 617. 
23 See e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-01-04.5 (1981) (to be denied right to vote one must 
have a guardian appointed); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 6.03(1)(a) (West 1986) (to be denied right to 
vote one must be under guardianship or adjudicated incapable of understanding the objective 
of the electoral process). 
24 See e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-6-7(5), (6) (1975) (license to drive witheld if the mental 
disability would prevent the driver from exercising reasonable and ordinary care over the 
vehicle); ALASKA STAT. § 28.15.031(b)(4) (1984) (no license if department has determined 
that the person cannot drive safely because of the mental disability). 
25 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 (1979). Regarding a mentally disabled 
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Some courts even require medical treatment facilities to consult 
their mentally retarded patients before administering any form of 
medical care. 26 
Increased societal awareness, however, has hurt rather than 
helped the mentally retarded in the criminal context. Upon deliv-
e~ing a conviction, a jury is permitted to use a defendant's lower 
intelligence and mental disability as justification for mitigating a 
particular defendant's sentence.27 The ability of juries to consider 
these mitigating factors is crucial for mentally retarded defendants 
who seek to use their subaverage intelligence as a defense to full 
culpability. Nonetheless, in practice, juries have not accepted mental 
retardation as a significant mitigating factor. 28 The response of 
juries to mental retardation, particularly those individuals whose 
lifestyle indicates that they are apparently able to function normally, 
indicates that mental retardation rarely mitigates in favor of a lesser 
sentence for these defendants. 29 
Despite the trend toward treating the mentally retarded as 
normal adults, Penry contends that contemporary standards indi-
cate that there is strong public sentiment against the execution of 
mentally retarded defendants.3o As evidence in support of this ar-
gument, Penry offers public opinion indicia including a public opin-
ion poll, Supreme Court decisions and state legislation. Penry first 
cites to a public opinion survey.3l This survey has limited evidentiary 
value, however, because it only polled Florida residents.32 Since the 
briefs were filed, a new Texas poll indicated that 73% of the people 
who participated opposed capital punishment for mentally retarded 
person's capacity to make a will, see GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-21 (1982); MD. EST. & TRUSTS 
CODE ANN. § 4-101 (1974). 
26 See e.g., Rogers v. Commission of the Dep't of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 
N.E.2d 308 (1983). For development of the treatment rights for the mentally disabled, see 
Weiner, Treatment Rights, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED, supra note 22, at 327,340-51. 
27 See statutes listed infra note 134. 
28 Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463, 1483 (4th Cir. 1985) (borderline retardate received 
death penalty where jury had considered defendant's mental condition as mitigation but 
concluded "circumstances warranted" death); State v. Middleton, 368 S.E.2d 457, 461 (S.C. 
1988) (borderline retardate with IQ of 68 received death penalty where jury had considered 
his mental condition "as indicated by the mitigating circumstances in evidence"). 
29 See supra note 28; cf. infra note 123. 
30 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 49. 
31 Id. at 38. The survey was conducted by Amnesty International, and showed that 71 % 
of those polled were opposed to executing mentally retarded defendants. 
32 Despite the fact that the poll was conducted in Florida and therefore has limited 
relevance to public sentiment in Texas, respondent argues that the survey also suffers from 
methodological flaws and bias. Brief for Respondent at 40-41, Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 
915 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988) (No. 87-6177). 
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defendants.33 These results may be meaningless to the Court due 
to the polls' challenged methodology. 34 
More importantly, Penry refers the Court to its recent holdings 
in Thompson v. Oklahoma35 and Ford v. Wainwright. 36 In Thompson, the 
Court held that the execution of defendants under the age of 
sixteen was constitutionally prohibitedY Ford prohibits the execu-
tion of defendants who are presently insane.38 These decisions may 
be relevant to the Court's determination in Penry. They are by no 
means conclusive, however, because neither case involved a mentally 
retarded defendant. 
Finally, Penry relies on a Georgia statute that prohibits the 
execution of mentally retarded individuals by allowing them to use 
a "guilty but mentally retarded" plea during the sentencing phase.39 
A similar piece of legislation is currently being considered by the 
Texas legislature.4o Although the Texas statute, if passed, would 
probably not apply retroactively to Johnny Paul Penry, it would 
indicate that citizens do not want the Texas death penalty statute 
to apply to mentally retarded defendants. The fact that only one 
relevant piece of legislation exists, however, indicates that society 
condones, not condemns, the execution of mentally retarded de-
fendants.41 
2. Social Goals Served by Capital Punishment in Penry 
The Court in Penry will likely also consider whether the exec-
ution of mentally retarded defendants serves the judicially recog-
nized goals of punishment, retribution and deterrence.42 If punish-
ment by death does not achieve these goals to a greater extent than 
a lesser punishment, the death penalty degenerates into the "point-
less infliction of suffering" that is the very essence of "cruel and 
33 Respondent's Supplemental Brief app. A, Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 
1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988) (No. 87-6177). 
34 Respondent argues that this survey is "virtually meaningless" because it did not include 
the degree of retardation or the facts of the offense. Respondent's Supplemental Brief, supra 
note 33, at 2. 
35 108 S. Ct. 2687. 
36 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
37 108 S. Ct. at 2700. 
38 477 U.S. at 409-10. 
39 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (Supp. 1988). 
40 H.R. 55, 71st Texas Leg., 1988 (authored by Rep. Bob Melton). 
41 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 32, at 40. 
42 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182-83. 
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unusual."43 To the extent that retribution and deterrence are still 
valid functions of the death penalty, execution of mentally retarded 
defendants promotes these goals. 
The Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia validated retribution as 
a legitimate objective in deciding when the death penalty ought to 
be imposed.44 Retribution serves to ensure that justice has been 
served. Punishment of offenders is an "expression of society's moral 
outrage" that its mores have been violated.45 The rationale behind 
retribution as a function of punishment is that one who has morally 
offended society deserves to be punished, and that punishment 
should proportionately reflect the severity of the offense.46 Retri-
bution in death penalty cases has often been criticizedY The Su-
preme Court itself admitted that it may be "unappealing to many."48 
The Court in Gregg concluded, however, that retribution is "essen-
tial in an ordered society" in order to prevent resort to self-help 
methods and vigilantism.49 
Amici claim that the execution of mentally retarded defendants 
has no retributive value. They reason that any mentally retarded 
def~ndant is less blameworthy than a normal offender simply due 
to impaired cognitive abilities. 50 Although admitting that the level 
of impairment varies among mentally retarded individuals in the 
various classifications, amici claim that the impairment will never 
be so slight as to approach the normal intelligence range.51 If the 
Court were to decide that mentally retarded persons could never 
be executed, however, it would provoke the very moral outrage 
which the death penalty was intended to redress. Through such a 
decision, the Court would excuse all defendants who happened to 
be mentally retarded, regardless of the heinousness of their offen-
ses. This is contrary to the very ideals of an ordered society. 52 
Deterrence is also an issue which the Court will consider in 
determining whether execution is an appropriate punishment for 
43 Furman, 408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, j., concurring). 
44428 U.S. at 183. 
45Id. 
46Id. at 184. 
47 See e.g., j. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE 274 (1984). 
48 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183. 
491d. 
50 Amici, supra note II, at 19. 
511d. at 15. 
52 "When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose 
upon criminal offenders the punishment they 'deserve,' then there are thrown the seeds of 
anarchy .... " Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, j., concur-
ring)). 
332 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:323 
mentally retarded offenders. The concept of deterrence encompas-
ses two goals. First, a punishment should deter the individual of-
fender from committing crimes in the future. This type of special 
deterrence is undoubtedly served because death as a form of pun-
ishment is "unique in its severity and irrevocability."53 Second, a 
punishment should serve as an example to the public at large in 
order to provide potential offenders with an incentive to keep their 
conduct within the limits of the law. 54 
Deterrence has been widely criticized. The rationale for deter-
rence as an acceptable goal of punishment assumes that the indi-
vidual has weighed the costs and benefits of alternative acts and has 
exercised rational judgment in choosing to pursue the unlawful 
one.55 The individual's awareness that he would be punished by 
death for the unlawful act would presumably be a cost that would 
outweigh the benefits of the choice. 56 One critic seems to suggest 
that where a crime is attributable to a factor such as mental retar-
dation, the claim that these murderers consciously weigh the pros 
and cons of their illegal acts is untenable.57 The Supreme Court 
responded to this argument in Gregg, holding that there are in-
stances where death "undoubtedly is a significant deterrent."58 
Amici contend that capital punishment has no deterrent effect 
on mentally retarded defendants. 59 Amici explain that mentally 
retarded individuals generally cannot distinguish right from 
wrong.60 A large number of mentally retarded individuals also ex-
hibit an inability to learn from their mistakes.61 Therefore, the 
likelihood that mentally retarded defendants would weigh the con-
sequences of their conduct before acting on their impulses is slight. 
The notion that capital punishment will have no deterrent effect 
on mentally retarded defendants actually works against such defen-
dants before a jury. Defendants who cannot appreciate the conse-
quences of their conduct represent a continuing threat to society 
and are thus the very offenders who should theoretically receive 
the death penalty.62 
53 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187. 
54Id. at 185-86. 
55 J. BOWERS, supra note 47, at 272. 
56Id. at 272-73. 
57Id. at 272. 
58 428 U.S. at 185-86. 
59 Amici, supra note 11, at 19. 
6°Id. at 8. 
61Id. at 7. 
62 As a result, defense lawyers may be hesitant to bring up their clients' mental retardation 
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B. The Texas Statute and Its Application in Penry 
Penry also challenges the constitutionality of the Texas death 
penalty statute.63 Penry claims that the jury was "effectively pre-
cluded" from considering his mental retardation as a mitigating 
factor in imposing punishment.64 Penry also contends that the jury 
was inadequately informed as to the weight it could give to miti-
gating factors, such as mental retardation, due to insufficient jury 
instructions.65 Even though counsel for Penry claims that a blanket 
exclusion for this group is "appropriate and necessary,"66 the Penry 
appeal may be resolved simply by re-examining the validity of the 
Texas statute or by declaring the jury instructions insufficient. 
These alternatives would require a retrial of Penry's sentence on 
remand. Either of these two alternatives are likely to be more ap-
pealing to the Court than the radical departure from capital pun-
ishment standards advocated by petitioner. 
1. The Constitutionality of the Texas Death Penalty Statute 
The Texas death penalty statute provides that if the jury affir-
matively answers three "special issues," the court must sentence the 
defendant to death.67 In the Penry case, two issues were relevant to 
sentencing: the deliberateness of Penry's conduct and the probabil-
ity of his future threat to society. Penry argues that this type of 
mandatory sentencing scheme conflicts with the idea that juries 
must be allowed to act upon any mitigating circumstances that they 
consider relevant to their determination.68 The Supreme Court has 
during sentencing out of fear that the jury will hold the disability against the defendant. See 
Reid, Unknowing Punishment, Student Law., May 1987, at 18,22. 
63 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at i. 
64Id. at 35. 
65Id. Penry's claim of inadequate jury instructions is two-fold: the court failed to define 
specific terms, and the court failed to inform the jury the manner of consideration it could 
give to mitigating evidence. This Note will concentrate on the latter claim. 
66Id. at 16. 
67 Petitioner in Penry was convicted of murder under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 
(Vernon 1974), and was sentenced to death according to TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 
§ 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1987), which requires the jury to answer three special 
issues: (1) whether the conduct of the defendant ... was committed deliberately and with 
the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result; (2) whether 
there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would 
constitute a continuing threat to society; and (3) whether the conduct of the defendant in 
killing the deceased was reasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased. 
Penry, 832 F.2d at 919. 
68 832 F.2d at 920. 
334 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:323 
required the incorporation of mitigating factors in sentencing stat-
utes in order to ensure that death penalties would not be imposed 
arbitrarily.69 A death penalty imposed arbitrarily constitutes a cruel 
and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment. 
By failing to provide the jury with the opportunity to grant 
mercy to Penry, the statute placed an "intolerable burden" on Penry 
at trial,7° The jury's response to the special issues, based on the 
evidence, would be in the affirmative, and thus the death penalty 
would be mandatory. In order to be spared from capital punish-
ment, Penry argues that his only choice was to ask the jury to violate 
their sworn duty to apply the law: 
Penry could only suggest to the jury that if they did not believe 
a mentally retarded person should get the death penalty they 
should pick one special issue and vote 'no' even if the State had 
proven the answer should be 'yes.' That is, Penry could only 
suggest jury nullification of the law. 71 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressed concern 
that the "facial narrowness" of the statute may have precluded the 
jury from fully acting upon Penry's arrested mental and emotional 
development.72 The court stated, "Penry's conviction is a good ex-
ample of mitigating circumstances that pose a problem under the 
Texas scheme," because despite the abundance of evidence that 
indicated that Penry was less culpable than the ordinary offender, 
the death penalty was imposed. 73 
Arguably, Penry's mental retardation would be considered by 
the jury when determining the deliberateness of the crime and his 
potential threat to society.74 Even if Penry's mental retardation and 
abnormal childhood had been considered, however, these factors 
probably would have prompted the jury to answer the special issues 
affirmatively. Thus, the Texas statute does not provide a framework 
which allowed the jury to depart from its responses to the special 
issues and grant a lesser sentence to Penry. Instead, the statute 
69 E.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); 
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153; Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 
(1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 
(1976). 
70 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 25. 
71 [d. at 24. 
72 Penry, 832 F.2d at 926. Mitigating evidence to be used by the jury included the fact 
that defendant could not read or write, never advanced beyond the first grade, was diagnosed 
as mildly to moderately retarded, and had an abused childhood. Id. at 925. 
73 [d. at 925. 
74 Id.; see also Penry, 832 F.2d at 927 (Garwood, Circuit Judge, concurring). 
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increased the likelihood that mentally retarded defendants like 
Penry would receive the death penalty. 
The Fifth Circuit points out how evidence that should have 
served to mitigate against death "made it more likely, not less likely," 
that a death sentence would be imposed: 75 
[T]he Penry jury was allowed only to answer two questions. 
First, was the killing deliberate with reasonable expectation of 
death. Having just found Penry guilty of an intentional killing, 
and rejecting his insanity defense, the answer to that issue was 
likely to be yes .... The second question then asked whether 
Penry would be a continuing threat to society. The mitigating 
evidence shows that Penry could not learn from his mistakes. 
That suggests an affirmative answer to the second question. 76 
Although expressing an opinion that the Texas statute may indeed 
be unconstitutional, the Fifth Circuit did not feel that it had the 
authority to declare it invalid. 77 The court declared itself bound by 
the Supreme Court's decision in Jurek v. Texas78 and subsequent 
Fifth Circuit cases which upheld the constitutionality of the Texas 
death penalty statute. 79 Although Jurek was the Court's response to 
the same statutory claim presented in Penry's appeal, neither Jurek 
nor any of its upholding cases involved a challenge brought by a 
mentally retarded defendant sentenced according to the Texas stat-
ute. 
2. The Adequacy of the Jury Instructions 
If the Supreme Court reaffirms its Jurek holding, Penry's sen-
tence may be reversed on the basis of inadequate jury instructions. 
In resolving the special issues, the jury was instructed to take into 
consideration all of the evidence submitted during the full trial of 
the case. 80 Petitioner claims that this instruction was insufficient, for 
it failed to tell the jury where and how mitigating circumstances 
could affect its responses to the two issues.sl In an objection raised 
at trial, defense counsel requested that the jury be instructed as 
follows: 
75 Penry, 832 F.2d at 925. 
76 [d. 
77 [d. The Fifth Circuit arrives at its holding rather abruptly, resulting in an illogical 
conclusion based on the court's previous analysis of the deficiencies in the Texas statute. 
78 428 U.S. at 276. 
79 Penry, 832 F.2d at 926. 
RO Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 21. 
81 !d. at 24. 
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you may take into consideration all of the evidence ... submit-
ted to you in ... the trial of the first part of this case wherein 
you were called up[on] to determine the guilt or innocence of 
the Defendant and all of the evidence ... as permitted for you 
in the second part of the trial wherein you are called upon to 
determine the special issues hereby submitted to yoU.82 
Counsel for petitioner claimed that the jury should have been told 
not only that it may consider all of the evidence, whether mitigating 
or aggravating, but that they should also have been instructed how 
to act upon this evidence. 83 
Should the Supreme Court agree with Penry's argument, there 
is still a possibility that Penry will receive the death penalty On 
remand. Although this argument is not the most beneficial for 
Penry, it is the least controversial meanS of resolving Penry's appeal. 
If resolved On this point, it would not be the first time the Court 
has reversed a death sentence On a procedural deficiency rather 
than addressing the broader constitutional issue of the limits of the 
death penalty in general. 84 
III. THE MENTALLY RETARDED DEFENDANT IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM: ISSUES OF COMPETENCY AND CULPABILITY 
Two essential issues are raised when mentally retarded individ-
uals are accused of a criminal offense. First, the court must deter-
mine if the mentally retarded defendant is competent to stand trial. 
If so, a defendant's retardation may still be brought up as a defense 
prior to sentencing, when the court determines whether the defen-
dant possesses the requisite culpability to justify the full imposition 
of criminal liability. Thus, two sets of issues not presented for the 
Court's consideration are nonetheless raised by the Penry appeal. 
The risk of mentally retarded defendants receiving the death pen-
alty could be eliminated by either excluding them from trial on 
competency grounds or by broadly interpreting the insanity plea in 
82 [d. at 5. 
83 Penry, 832 F.2d at 920. 
84 The Supreme Court had the opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of executing 
a juvenile defendant in Eddings, but avoided the challenge by deciding the case on less 
controversial grounds. 455 U.S. at 104. The Court focused on the trial judge's refusal to 
consider the defendant's young age, immaturity and troubled childhood. [d. at 112-17. The 
Court held that the trial judge'S decision contradicted the established guidelines for the 
consideration of mitigating factors. [d. For criticism of the Court's decision, see generally 
Case Comment, Eighth Amendment - Minors and the Death Penalty: Decision and Avoidance, 73 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1525 (1973) [hereinafter Decision and Avoidance]. 
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order to encompass every mentally retarded defendant. These blan-
ket exclusion issues need to be analyzed according to their impact 
on the criminal justice system. Although the criminal system may 
put mentally retarded defendants at a disadvantage, these two al-
ternatives fail to evaluate individual offenders according to existing 
standards. 
Both competency and culpability entail an analysis of the de-
fendant's mental state. The judicial inquiry differs, however, as to 
when the defendant's state of mind becomes an issue and what 
standards will be used to justify a release from liability. A compe-
tency hearing determines an accused's present ability to understand 
and assist in the trial proceedings.85 Where the issue is resolved at 
the beginning of the proceedings, the accused is removed before 
the issue of guilt or innocence is even considered. Mentally retarded 
defendants often do not meet the test for competency because their 
conduct at trial does not raise a doubt as to their ability to be a 
participant in the proceedings.86 Although the defendant's de-
meanor should not dispose of the issue, it nonetheless influences 
the court's determination.87 
A determination of competency has a detrimental effect on 
mentally retarded defendants, for it effectively precludes defen-
dants from using their mental disability as a defense. Culpability 
examines the mental state of the defendant at the time of the 
commission of the crime.88 The issue of guilt is resolved, but defen-
dants may decrease their culpability by claiming that at the time of 
the offense they lacked the requisite capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of their conduct or could not conform their conduct 
to the law.89 Mental retardation is certainly a mental state which 
should be taken into account when determining the issue of culp-
ability. Juries, however, have not reacted by considering retardation 
as a mitigating factor at sentencing.90 Where a court has determined 
that a defendant is competent to stand trial, the court in effect states 
85 Weiner, Mental Disability and the Criminal Law, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED, supra note 
22, at 693, 693. 
86 See Allard v. Hegemore, 572 F.2d 1,5 (1st Cir. 1978); Bowers v. Battles, 568 F.2d 1, 
4-5 (6th Cir. 1977). There is also evidence that Penry's conduct may have influenced the 
jury, particularly where testifying experts noted his alertness and ability to carryon a con-
versation. Brief for Respondent, supra note 32, at 8-9. 
87 See United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
88 Weiner, supra note 85, at 693. 
89 See infra notes 258-259 and accompanying text. 
90 See supra note 28. 
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that the defendant's retardation is not substantial enough to warrant 
a lesser sentence.91 
A. Standards to Measure Competency 
Three factors which determine if a defendant is competent to 
stand trial are relevant to mentally retarded defendants. First, de-
fendants should have the mental ability to cooperate fully in the 
proceedings.92 This assures that the defendant can be an active 
participant in the trial, resulting in the disclosure of all relevant 
facts and a fair tria1.93 Second, defendants should have the mental 
ability necessary in order to exercise their fundamental rights. 94 
The most important right which must be protected is the defen-
dants' ability to waive their right against self-incrimination. Third, 
defendants should have the ability to comprehend the punishment 
and the reasons for it. 95 Thus, the mere fact a defendant is mentally 
retarded does not render him incompetent to stand trial. 96 Mentally 
disabled individuals must show something in addition to the mere 
presence of the mental impairment in order to convince the court 
that they are incompetent.97 
In Dusky v. United States, the Supreme Court defined the test 
for competency as whether a defendant has "sufficient present abil-
ity to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding - and whether he has a rational as well as a factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him."98 Competency 
should not be determined based on whether "the defendant [is] 
oriented to time and place."99 Generally, statutes after Dusky require 
that defendants show that they lack the capacity either to assist in 
their own defense or to understand the nature of the proceed-
ings. loo The mentally retarded, because of inaccurate application of 
"I See People v. Reynolds, 65 A.D.2d 952, 953, 410 N.Y.S.2d 484, 485 (1978). 




% Mickenberg, Competency to Stand Trial, 17 CAL. W.L. REV. 365, 390 (1981). See also 
McCune v. Estelle, 534 F.2d 611, 612 (5th Cir. 1976) (low intelligence cannot be equated 
with incompetency). 
97 See Graham v. Lynaugh, 854 F.2d 715, 721 (5th Cir. 1988); McCune, 534 F.2d at 612. 
9H 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (quoting the Solicitor General). 
9" Id. 
1IJ() See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-56(d) (West 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-
3-1(a) (Burns 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 para. 104-11(a) (Smith-Hurd 1980). 
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the Dusky standard, often are not declared incompetent to stand 
trial. 
Statutory standards for the determination of competency in-
clude three major elements: who can raise the issue of competency, 
who will determine competency, and what will be required for a 
finding in favor of the defendant. lol The issue of a defendant's 
competence may be raised by the prosecution, defense, and even 
the judge. 102 The judge's decision will usually depend on whether 
a reasonable belief exists as to the defendant's capacity to partici-
pate. I03 Statutes do not define what types of evidence are sufficient 
to raise a reasonable belief. Despite the Supreme Court's warning 
that determinations of competency should not be based on whether 
the defendant is oriented to time and place, this factor inevitably 
influences the judge's decision. 104 
Mental retardation does not raise a reasonable doubt as to 
competency, particularly when the disability is mild or moderate. 
First, a jury brings its layman's definition of "mild" or "moderate" 
to the courtroom, and thus may believe that a retarded individual 
with this "label" has a lesser disability.105 Second, the jury may find 
it difficult to match mental ability to a defendant's IQ.lo6 Proof in 
the form of a lower than average IQ is sometimes the only evidence 
a defendant has. It is usually not sufficient evidence, however, to 
101 See supra note 100; infra notes 102-103 and note 114. 
102 State statutes allow counsel for defendant or for the state to raise the issue of com-
petency. See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-IIO(2)(b) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 54-56d(c) (West 1985); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. § 642(a) (West 1981). Some statutes 
reserve discretion to the trial judge. See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-110(2)(a) (1986); D.C. 
CODE ANN. § 24-3-I(a) (1981). 
103 See e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 para. § 104-11 (a) (Smith-Hurd 1980) (bona fide doubt); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-3-I(a) (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1988) (reasonable grounds to doubt); 
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.100(1) (Michie 1985) (reasonable grounds to doubt). 
104 Supra note 87. Failure to apply the correct competency standard may be attributed 
to the Supreme Court's holding in Ford v. Wainwright, which was unclear as to what 
procedures are necessary to resolve a doubt of sanity. See Martin, 686 F. Supp. at 1557 (Ford 
is a "procedural quagmire"). E.g., 106 S. Ct. at 2606 (Marshall, j., concurring) (de novo 
evidentiary hearing required); [d. at 2610 (Powell, j., concurring) ("substantial threshold 
showing [is necessary] merely to trigger the hearing process"). See e.g., Lowenfield v. Butler, 
108 S. Ct. 1456, 1457 (1988) (Court denied stay of execution over dissent's strong objection 
that defendant's evidence constituted reasonable grounds for a hearing). 
10, Labels assigned according to the degree of disability create a problem for the layman, 
who may interpret "borderline," "mild," or "moderate" as euphemistic terms indicating that 
the individual's retardation is relatively minor. Ellis, supra note 13, at 423. 
lOt; A jury may be incapable of understanding, without adequate explanation, that an IQ 
of 70, which marks the upper range of mental retardation, is two standard deviations below 
the average person's score. See Ellis, supra note 13, at 422; Amici, supra note II, at 5. 
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who is a retarded illiterate. 124 The Fifth Circuit, applying Connelly, 
found that Penry had voluntarily waived his rights. 125 
Some commentators claim that mentally retarded individuals 
respond to police questions in an attempt to please the interroga-
tor.126 Thus, it is arguable that mentally retarded individuals truly 
understand the concept of waiver. 127 The mentally retarded defen-
dant is unable, however, to prevent the prosecution from using pre-
trial statements as part of the case. Thus, in Penry, the jury was 
allowed to hear Penry's confession. 12R Connelly also works against 
the retarded defendant in a competency hearing. It indicates to the 
court that the defendant has a rational as well as a factual under-
standing of the proceedings. 
At least two alternatives exist to resolve the competency of 
mentally retarded offenders. First, the courts or the legislatures 
could devise a standard designed for mentally retarded defendants. 
For example, Florida provides for the appointment of an expert 
experienced in mental retardation when the issue of competence 
raised at trial is based on a suspicion that the defendant is mentally 
retarded. 129 This statute at least guarantees that the proper expert 
is conducting the competency evaluation. Second, courts could find 
that all mentally retarded defendants are incompetent to stand trial. 
A blanket finding of incompetency would remove all mentally re-
tarded defendants from criminal proceedings, thus eliminating the 
risk that a defendant like Penry would ever receive the death pen-
alty. This form of exclusion is inappropriate. Though all mentally 
retarded persons may have some cognitive impairment, it is inac-
curate to declare all mentally retarded defendants incompetent. 
Their disability may have been ameliorated through education or 
the "normalization" process of habilitation. Where this type of ha-
bilitation is successful and available, it reinforces the need for a case 
with an IQ of 70 voluntarily waived his rights where he was employed, could read and write, 
and was enrolled in a carpentry course); People v. Lux, 328 N.Y.S.2d 587, N.E.2d 923 (1971) 
(borderline retardate with eighth grade education waived his rights where he was able to 
hold a job in the armed forces and thus was capable of functioning normally in society). 
Compare People v. Bruce, 62 A.D.2d 1073, 1073,403 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (1978) (defendant 
with an IQ of 79 did not voluntarily waive his rights where he could not read and was not 
gainfully employed). 
124 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 4. 
125 Penry, 832 F.2d at 918. 
126 Reid, supra note 62, at 20. 
127Id. 
12R Penry, 832 F.2d at 918. 
129 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 916.II(l)(d) (West Supp. 1989). 
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by case determination of the competency of mentally retarded of-
fenders. 
B. Mitigating Factors and Reduced Culpability 
A finding of competency at trial has a detrimental effect on 
mentally retarded defendants who wish to bring up their mental 
state during the sentencing proceedings. This result may have oc-
curred in Penry. The jury has the ultimate discretion to consider a 
defendant's retardation in order to justify a reduced sentence. How-
ever, when mentally retarded defendants such as Penry who are 
found competent offer evidence of their mental disability to miti-
gate against a harsh punishment, juries nonetheless impose the 
death penalty.130 The behavior of the Penry jury suggests its belief 
that if a mentally retarded defendant "is mentally competent to be 
held guilty of a capital crime, ... he is competent to be punished 
for that crime."131 
By having the discretion to impose life imprisonment during 
the sentencing phase, juries have statutory authority to grant mercy 
to a defendant convicted of a crime punishable by death. 132 Statutes 
may grant the jury the opportunity to consider any evidence it 
believes demonstrates a need to reduce the sentence under the 
circumstances. 133 Some legislatures developed a list of factors which 
should be considered in mitigation. 134 In these statutes, three factors 
are particularly relevant to mentally retarded defendants. First, the 
jury may address whether the defendant committed the felony while 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
Second, the jury can consider whether the defendant had the ca-
pacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law. A third factor affecting a 
mentally retarded person's sentence is the jury's consideration of 
the age or mental state of the defendant. Yet even where mitigating 
factors to be considered are specifically listed by statute, the jury 
130 See State v. Brogdon, 426 So.2d IS8, 167-68 (La. 1983) (reduced culpability claim 
rejected based on evidence presented in competency hearing). Cf Bowden v. State, 2S0 Ga. 
at 186-87, 296 S.E.2d at S77 (petition for new trial rejected despite new evidence which 
could have been relevant to competency and mitigation). 
131 Brogdon, 824 F.2d at 341. 
132 See statutes listed supra note 17. 
133 See e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 4209(c) (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-1O-30(b) 
(1982); IDAHO CODE § 19-2SIS(c) (1987). 
134 See e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-S-SI (l97S); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(g) (1978 & 
Supp. 1988); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (1988). 
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remains free to consider any evidence that has been presented 
throughout the proceedings in determining appropriate punish-
ment. 135 
Essential to a fair sentence is the opportunity for the jury to 
hear and act upon the evidence presented. 136 Preservation of this 
opportunity requires proper jury instruction as to the "nature and 
function of mitigating circumstances."137 Jurors need to be re-
minded that they have absolute discretion to consider all evidence 
they have heard. 138 Some states ensure the jury's consideration by 
requiring that the jury put in writing the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances which it found relevant to its determination. 139 
Culpability is relevant to Penry because Penry raises an issue as 
to what weight mitigating factors should be given. Penry's challenge 
asserts, in effect, that all defendants who can demonstrate that one 
or more of the statutory mitigating factors is applicable should never 
receive the death penalty.140 No court, however, has interpreted 
sentencing statutes in the manner that Penry proposes. Such an 
interpretation equates the jury's consideration with a "quantitative 
or tallying process," where defendants whose total number of mit-
igating factors exceed the number of aggravating factors would be 
excused from the death penalty.141 Weighing aggravating and mit-
igating factors is a discretionary process, not an absolute "predicate" 
for a life sentence reduction. 142 
Respondent in Penry argues that Penry's sentence did result 
from a consideration of the mitigating factors in evidence. 143 The 
135 Statutes may allow juries to consider any mitigating factors authorized by law in 
addition to the listed provisions. See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53(a)-46a(g) (1985); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(c) (Law. Coop. 1976 & Supp. 1988). Case law interpreting the statutory 
provisions has also found no limit on what the jury may consider as mitigating evidence as 
to the particular defendant. See e.g., Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-14; Redd v. State, 242 Ga. 876, 
882, 252 S.E.2d 383, 388 (1979). The jury is restricted, however, to the aggravating circum-
stances which are enumerated. See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (1985 & Supp. 1989); 
OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (1983 & Supp. 1989). 
136 Penry, 832 F.2d at 923-24. 
137 High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 998, 990 (II th Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub nom. High v. Zant, 
108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988). In this case, even though the judge did not "belabor instructions on 
mitigation," there was no need to because defendant had offered no mitigating evidence on 
his own behalf. 819 F.2d at 992. 
138 /d. at 991. 
139 See e.g., S.c. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(c) (Law. Coop. 1976 & Supp. 1988). 
140 For a similar argument, see Brief of Appellant at 30, State v. Roach, 273 S.C. 194, 
255 S.E.2d 799 (1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 437 (1980) {No. 79-5247). 
141 Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d at 415-16. 
142 Thomas v. State, 240 Ga. 393, 40 I, 242 S.E.2d I, 7 (1977). 
143 Brief for Respondent, supra note 32, at 23-24. 
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fact that Penry received the death penalty thus reflects "the extent 
that the jury believed that Penry's crime was attributable to" his 
mental retardation and abusive childhood. 144 While respondent's 
argument may be valid in terms of the jury's answers to the special 
issues, it leaves open the possibility that the jury was not properly 
instructed. 
IV. A JUVENILE MODEL FOR MENTALLY RETARDED DEFENDANTS 
By designing a criminal justice system sensitive to the unique 
characteristics of mentally retarded defendants, doctrines of com-
petency and culpability could be used to protect these defendants 
from injustice. One potential model for dealing with mentally re-
tarded individuals is the criminal justice system's treatment of ju-
veniles. Historically, society has paternalistically protected juveniles 
from the full consequences of their actions. Recent convictions of 
juvenile defendants, however, indicate that society is taking a less 
lenient attitude toward youthful offenders. 145 The Supreme Court, 
however, has resisted this recent trend toward treating juveniles as 
adults. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court held that execution of a 
fifteen year-old defendant is cruel and unusual punishment. 146 The 
holding in Thompson is particularly significant in determining how 
the criminal justice system should treat mentally retarded defen-
dants such as Penry. If the Court accepts the proposition that men-
tally retarded individuals are similar to juveniles, it may reverse 
Penry's sentence under Thompson. Still, it is likely that the Court will 
apply Thompson narrowly, to juveniles only. 
A. Age and Mental Retardation 
The similarity of mentally retarded individuals to juveniles is 
illustrated by the definition of mental retardation adopted by the 
American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD). This charac-
terization has been universally accepted by other professional com-
munities, and by legislation and court opinions. 147 The AAMD clas-
sifies mental retardation as a deficit in intellectual functioning and 
144Id. 
145 The increasing number of juvenile offenders has led to a "get tough" stance in the 
courts, allowing juveniles to be prosecuted as adults. See Note, The Decency of Capital Punishment 
for Minors: Contemporary Standards and the Dignity of Juveniles, 61 IND. L.J. 757,757-59 (1986) 
[hereinafter Capital Punishment for Minors]. 
146 108 S. Ct. at 2700. 
147 Amici, supra note II, at 5. 
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adaptive behavior, which exhibits itself as a "significant limitation 
in an individual's effectiveness in meeting the standards of matur-
ation, learning, personal independence and/or social responsibility 
that are expected for his or her age level."148 This deficit becomes 
more apparent when a mental age is assigned to the retarded in-
dividual's disability. 
When classifying an individual's degree of retardation, the ex-
tent of the mentally retarded person's intellectual functioning is 
compared to the level of cognitive ability found in a person of 
normal development. 149 Because mentally retarded persons have a 
significant impairment, their intellectual ability corresponds to that 
of a very young child. For example, Johnny Paul Penry, who has a 
mental age of six and one-half years, has the same ability to learn 
as a six and one-half year-old child. 150 Thus, his conduct should be 
evaluated in terms of his mental age, for he is drawing upon the 
knowledge that one would ordinarily expect a six and one-half year-
old child to have accumulated and retained. 151 Penry argues that, 
like children, mentally retarded individuals have an impaired ability 
to control impulse and to think in terms of cause and effect. 152 
Without the ability to think rationally, mentally retarded defendants 
lack an "essential ingredient" of culpability. 153 
This intellectual impairment, in turn, affects the social maturity 
of the retarded individual. I54 For example, the court-appointed 
psychiatrist in Penry determined that Johnny Paul Penry has a social 
maturity at the nine or ten year-old level. I55 Thus, he knows how 
to get around the world about as well as the average nine or ten 
year-old child. Therefore, he should be held accountable only for 
the experiences one might expect a nine or ten year-old child to 
have had. Yet despite the similarity in intelligence and maturity in 
mentally retarded and juvenile individuals, courts have generally 
not been convinced that a mentally retarded person represents the 
"full equivalent" of a juvenile.156 The behavior of juries, in punish-
ing mentally retarded defendants to the same extent as normal 
148 AAMD, supra note 8, at 11, quoted in Ellis, supra note 13, at 422. 
149 See supra note 13. 
150 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 46. 
151Id. 
152Id. at 49. 
153 Amici, supra note 11, at 7. 
154Id. at 6. 
155 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 46. 
156 Ellis, supra note 13, at 435. 
-----~---~ 
1989] MENTALLY RETARDED DEFENDANTS 347 
offenders, indicates the difficulty in adopting a juvenile analogy. 
Juries must be reacting to the appearance of mentally retarded 
defendants, specifically their physical age, rather than their mental 
age, because mentally retarded defendants are receiving the death 
penalty.157 Juries are not directing their inquiry to the "character 
and development of [the mentally retarded person's] mind."158 
The failure to treat the mentally retarded and juveniles as 
parallel classes of defendants in the criminal context is not consistent 
with the law's treatment of these two groups generally. The law 
fosters a "caring, nurturing parent" role with respect to juveniles. 159 
This paternalism is evident in the legislature's denial of the rights, 
privileges and duties of citizenship to juveniles because they involve 
decisions that youths are not yet qualified to undertake because of 
their lack of knowledge and experience. 160 The restrictions encom-
pass voting eligibility, driving and alcohol privileges, and mar-
riage. 161 Similarly, the law also takes a protective stance in its failure 
to extend citizenship privileges to those who are mentally retarded 
or mentally ill. 162 One commentator contends that the purpose of 
these laws is to protect the mentally retarded from themselves who, 
because of their inability to make rational decisions, may be hurt 
by a wrong decision. 163 
Some courts, however, do not altogether deny to mentally re-
tarded individuals privileges available to citizens of average intelli-
gence. The legal community has recognized that "mentally disabled" 
persons, which term encompasses the mentally retarded, have the 
capacity to contract and to convey property.164 Yet even in these 
157 See Penry. 832 F.2d at 917-18; Roach, 757 F.2d at 1483; Middleton, 368 S.E.2d at 461. 
See also Bowden v. State, 250 Ga. at 186-87,296 S.E.2d at 577 (new evidence of defendant's 
retardation did not convince the court that a new trial was necessary). 
158 Ellis, supra note 13, at 435 n.111 (quoting State v. Schilling, 95 N.J.L. 145, 148, 112 
A. 400, 402 (1920)). 
159 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2693 n.23. 
16°Id. 
161 State statutes reflect a unanimous view that these activities should be restricted as to 
children, but disagree at what age the restriction should be lifted. See Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 
at 2701-06. 
162 For example, the law may place restrictions on the right to vote for mentally retarded 
and mentally ill individuals. See e.g., ALA. CONST. Art. VIII § 182 (1975) (all idiots and insane 
persons shall be disqualified); ARIZ. CONST. Art. 7 § 2 (1984) (persons non compos mentis 
or insane shall not be qualified); CAL. CON ST. Art. 2 § 4 (1983) (mentally incompetent electors 
will be disqualified). 
163 Parry, Decision-Making Rights Over Persons and Property, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED, 
supra note 22, 435, 446 [hereinafter Decision-Making Rights]. 
164Id. at 439. Capacity to contract also includes the capacity to enter into a valid marriage 
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instances the law will retain a watchful eye over the transaction. 165 
Again, the law seeks to protect "disabled" individuals from doing 
something they would not otherwise have done if they had a full 
understanding of their actions and the resulting consequences. 166 
B. Mental Retardation and Thompson v. Oklahoma 
The Supreme Court held in Thompson v. Oklahoma that it is 
unconstitutional to impose capital punishment on a defendant who 
is fifteen years old at the time of the crime. 167 The defendant, 
William Wayne Thompson, was convicted of the murder of his 
brother-in-law and sentenced to death. 16B The facts of the case 
showed that "the victim had been shot twice, and that his throat, 
chest and abdomen had been cut. He also had multiple bruises and 
a broken leg. His body had been chained to a concrete block and 
thrown into a river where it remained for almost four weeks."169 
Despite the fact that Thompson was a "child" under state law, the 
lower court concluded that he should be held accountable for his 
acts to the same extent as an adult. 170 The trial court certified 
Thompson as an adult for purposes of the proceeding because there 
were no "reasonable prospects for rehabilitation" within the juvenile 
system. l7l At trial, Thompson was found guilty and sentenced to 
death. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed the 
conviction.172 The appellate court rejected Thompson's eighth 
amendment challenge, stating that imposition of the death penalty 
on a minor certified to stand trial as an adult does not constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment. 173 
contract. See generally Brakel, Family Law, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED, supra note 22, 507, 
507. 
165 According to the Second Restatement of Contracts, a person's capacity to contract is 
measured by his ability to understand the nature and consequences of the transaction. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1)(a) (1981). Similarly, the affected individual's 
capacity to marry depends upon his understanding of the nature of the marital relationship. 
Brakel, supra note 164, at 507. A will on behalf of a mentally disabled person is valid only 
upon a showing that the individual was of sound mind and memory and was aware of his 
possessions and of the persons to whom he wished to bequeath them. Decision-Making Rights, 
supra note 163, at 440. 
166 Decision-Making Rights, supra note 163, at 440. 
167 108 S. Ct. at 2700. 
168Id. at 2690. 
169Id. 
170/d. 
171Id. (Court's emphasis). 
172 Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986). 
173 Id. at 784. 
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The Supreme Court vacated the sentence and remanded the 
case to the lower court to determine the appropriate punishment. 174 
In reaching this decision, the Court focused on legislative deter-
minations, the behavior of juries and the promotion of deterrence 
and retribution. In finding a societal consensus against the execu-
tion of fifteen year-old minors, the Court cited to a nationwide 
adoption of statutes that set a minimum age for voting, driving, 
marrying and buying alcohol. 175 Even more persuasive to the Court 
was the existence of a juvenile court in each of the fifty states, none 
of which designated a maximum age for jurisdiction below the age 
of sixteen years. 176 This evidence, in addition to statutes that set the 
minimum age for death penalty eligibility at sixteen years, indicated 
to the Court that evolving standards of decency prohibited execu-
tion of defendants who were fifteen years old or younger at the 
time of their offense.177 Statistics used by the Court revealed that 
only five defendants slated for execution between 1982 and 1986 
were under the age of sixteen. 178 This emphasized to the Court that 
society, as exhibited in the behavior of juries, regarded the impo-
sition of the death penalty on a fifteen year-old defendant as "abhor-
rent to the conscience of the community."179 
The Court also reasoned that imposing capital punishment on 
defendants below the age of sixteen does not further the deterrent 
and retributive goals of punishment. 180 The Court stated that youths 
deserve a lesser punishment because they have less capacity to con-
trol their conduct and to think in long range terms than adults 
have. 181 Because juveniles are not capable of understanding the 
consequences of their conduct as a fully rational adult would, the 
Court reasoned that they will not be able to learn from their mis-
takes and reform their conduct accordingly.182 Similarly, the Court 
concluded that no retributive function is served by executing fifteen 
year-old defendants because they are not as culpable as adults who 
commit the same crimes. Punishment of fifteen year-olds, who lack 
the maturity and knowledge of adults, should reflect this reduced 
174 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2700. 
175Id. at 2693. 
176Id. 
177 I d. at 2696. 
178Id. at 2697. 
179Id. 
18°Id. at 2699. 
181Id. at 2698 (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115). 
182Id. at 2700. 
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blameworthiness. ls3 The death penalty, when imposed on this class 
of defendants, thus amounts to no more than the "purposeless and 
needless imposition of pain and suffering."ls4 
Dissenting, Justice Scalia stated that in some cases a juvenile 
defendant may not be mature and responsible enough to be pun-
ished as an adult. IS5 However, he would not allow an automatic 
exclusion to any defendant "so much as one day under sixteen."ls6 
The dissent rejects the premise that every defendant under the age 
of sixteen is insufficiently developed as "sociological[ly] and 
moral[ly] ... implausible."ls7 Justice O'Connor agrees with the dis-
sent here, stating in her concurring opinion that the characteristics 
that justify treating juveniles differently than adults will vary widely 
among different individuals of the same age. ISS The majority ap-
peared to have overlooked that Thompson was not an ordinary 
fifteen year-old. The murder he committed was particularly brutal, 
and was committed with deliberate premeditation. 189 Witnesses tes-
tifying at trial stated that Thompson told people of his plan to kill 
his brother-in-law so that his sister would "not have to worry about 
him anymore."190 Justice Scalia adopts the premise that regardless 
of physical age, some minors are so "fully 'streetwise,' hardened 
criminals [that they deserve] no greater consideration than that 
properly accorded all persons suspected of crime."191 The dissenting 
0pImon IS, In essence, a reaffirmation of the merits of a system 
which utilizes mitigating factors in sentence determinations on a 
case by case basis. 192 
183Id. at 2699. 
184 Coker, 433 U.S. at 592. 
185 The dissent treats ajuvenile's age as a "rebuttable presumption" of relative immaturity. 
Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2712 (Scalia, j., dissenting). 
186Id. 
187Id. at 2714. See also High, 819 F.2d at 993 ("Constitution does not prohibit imposing 
the death penalty on a defendant who, while seventeen years old, intentionally and viciously 
took a life in cold blood"). But see Capital Punishment for Minors, supra note 145, at 761 ("death 
penalty is always inappropriate for minors"). 
188 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2709 (O'Connor,j., concurring). O'Connor states that although 
drawing the line may falsely assume that individuals of the same age have the same maturity, 
failure to do so would be inconsistent with the way society'S laws have distinguished adults 
from children. 
189 108 S. Ct. at 2712 (Scalia, j., dissenting). 
190Id. 
191Id. at 2719 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 734 n.4 (1979) (Powell, j., 
dissenting)). 
192 Public opinion that youth should always be a factor bearing upon the jury's deter-
mination of punishment is reflected in statutory provisions. See statutes listed supra note 134. 
See also High, 819 F.2d at 993 (quoting Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091, 1098 (5th Cir. 
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1. Will the Penry Court Expand Thompson? 
The Supreme Court has been presented the opportunity in 
High v. Kemp and State v. Wilkins to hold that the execution of a 
defendant under the age of eighteen should be prohibited. 193 Re-
action of the individual members of the Court to the facts in Thomp-
son indicates that the Court will rule in favor of executing juvenile 
defendants over the age of fifteen. Although the Court generally 
agreed that there must be some age below which the death penalty 
may be inappropriate, the justices disagreed on the interpretation 
of the evidence as to where that line may be drawn. 194 This type of 
disagreement is not present in either High or Wilkins. In Thompson, 
the evidence used by the plurality to indicate society's repugnance 
toward the execution of fifteen year-old minors consisted of statutes 
which set the minimum age for imposition of the death penalty at 
sixteen or seventeen years. 195 Because the defendants in Wilkins and 
High are sixteen and seventeen years old, respectively, the Court 
implies that there is a societal consensus for executing these defen-
dants. 
Of equal significance to the Court's opinion in Thompson was 
that the defendant should never have been tried as an adult because 
the Oklahoma legislature chose to set the minimum age for criminal 
proceedings at sixteen years. 196 Again, neither the High or the Wilk-
ins appeal present these facts. The statutes involved in these two 
cases allow individuals of the defendants' ages to be properly tried 
and convicted as adults. 197 Therefore, these cases do not represent 
a ripe opportunity for the Supreme Court to expand the Thompson 
holding. 
The facts in High and Wilkins support the dissenting opinion 
in Thompson that age alone cannot dispose of the eighth amendment 
1984» {"Nothing in society's standards of decency compels more than the consideration of 
youth as a mitigating factor"). But see Capital Punishment for Minors, supra note 145, at 760-
61 (consideration of youth as a mitigating factor is insufficient). 
193 108 S. Ct. at 2896. 
194 Justice O'Connor stated that the fact that nineteen states have not set a minimum age 
for the death penalty has the legal effect of rendering juveniles death-eligible and thus 
presents a "real obstacle" to finding a consensus. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2708 (O'Connor, j., 
concurring). The dissent, focusing on recent legislation which lowered, not raised, the age 
at which juveniles could be tried as adults, claimed that society was adopting a tougher 
attitude with respect to juvenile offenders. Id. at 2715-16 (Scalia, j., dissenting). 
195 Supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
196 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2690 n.2. 
197 Georgia has set 17 years of age as the minimum age for the death penalty. GA. CODE 
ANN. § 17-9-3 (1982). The Missouri death penalty statute, however, does not explicitly state 
a minimum age for capital punishment. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 (Vernon Supp. 1989). 
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issue. Both Heath Wilkins, who was sixteen at the time of his crime, 
and Jose High, who was seventeen, exhibited the type of heinous, 
anti-social behavior which the death penalty seeks to remedy. Wilk-
ins was convicted of the murder of Nancy Allen, who was stabbed 
eight times during the course of a robbery committed by defen-
dant. 198 The evidence showed that Wilkins had deliberately planned 
the strategy of the robbery, stating to others that "he would kill 
whoever was behind the counter because he wanted no witnesses."199 
High also was convicted of a murder committed in the course of a 
robbery.20o High's victim was an eleven year-old boy, whom High 
repeatedly taunted before finally shooting him.201 These two defen-
dants do not represent the type of "child" whose age should be an 
excuse for their criminal conduct. Their relative maturity, as in 
their streetwiseness and intent, renders, if not requires, them to be 
tried and punished as adults. Their age should be considered only 
as mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase. 
If the Supreme Court refuses to accept a blanket exclusion 
based on a defendant's age, the Court will likewise deny Penry a 
reprieve from death row simply because of his mental retardation. 
As with juveniles, whose age is not a conclusive indication of ma-
turity, the degree of retardation and therefore the extent of per-
sonal responsibility will vary with the individual. The fact that some 
mentally retarded persons can learn, live and work normally202 
emphasizes the validity of individual determinations of defendants' 
culpability. Therefore retardation, like age, should remain as miti-
gating evidence only, not a complete release from punishment as 
advocated by petitioner in Penry. 
2. Will the Penry Court Adopt a Juvenile Analogy? 
Penry may not even have to rely on the outcome of High and 
Wilkins if he can convince the Court to adopt the juvenile compar-
ison. Because Penry has a mental age of six and a half years, 
Thompson, which prohibits the execution of any offender under the 
age of sixteen years, would be directly applicable. A decision in 
favor of the defendants in High and Wilkins, however, would indi-
198 Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d at 412. 
1991d. at 411. 
200 High, 819 F.2d at 990. 
20lld. 
202 Amici, supra note II, at 6. 
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cate that mental ability, like age, can operate as a fixed standard in 
death penalty cases. 
In order to prove that a similarity exists between juveniles and 
mentally retarded individuals, Penry will need to convince the Court 
that he has lived a life of comparable quality to that of a six and 
one-half year-old child. This would require a factual investigation 
of Penry's own experiences and mental maturity. In order for a 
blanket exclusion based on a defendant's mental age to work, courts 
would need to look at the facts in each case where a mentally 
retarded defendant's mental age was below the fifteen year-old 
level. This type of inquiry, however, is already provided for in 
statutory mitigation requirements. 
There is some indication in Thompson that the Court would be 
hesitant to make this analogy. In Justice O'Connor's concurring 
opinion in Thompson, she emphasizes that her holding "does not 
imply that [she] would reach a similar conclusion in cases involving 
'those of extremely low intelligence, or those over 75 [sic], or any 
number of other appealing groups as to which the existence of a 
national consensus regarding capital punishment may be in doubt 
.... "'203 In deciding that the execution of defendant in Thompson 
was unconstitutional, Justice O'Connor based her opinion not on 
the nature of the defendant, but on the nature of the sentencing 
statute. The statute, she reasoned, lacked the "earmarks of careful 
consideration" because it was not clear whether the legislature in-
tended to include minors as eligible for the death penalty.204 Any 
future opinion she would render in favor of a similarly "appealing" 
group would require "similarly persuasive evidence."205 Because the 
constitutionality of the Texas death penalty statute is being chal-
lenged on the grounds that its provisions are vague, the Court could 
use O'Connor's rationale in Thompson to decide Penry. By doing so, 
the Court would be finding in favor of the individual defendant, 
and not in favor of the group defendant represents, as it did in 
Eddings v. Oklahoma. 206 
V. THE MENTALLY ILL AND THE MENTALLY RETARDED 
In deciding Penry, the Supreme Court may feel more secure in 
drawing upon an established field of law, the criminal treatment of 
203 108 S. Ct. at 2711 n. * (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
204Id. at 2711. 
205Id. at 2711 n.*. 
206 Supra note 84. 
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the mentally insane. Not only has the law reflected a more compas-
sionate treatment of the mentally ill, the Supreme Court itself held 
that the execution of a defendant who is insane because afflicted 
with a mental illness is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited 
by the eighth amendment. No court, however, has applied the Ford 
holding to mentally retarded defendants. 207 In fact, the professional 
community claims that the problems faced by mentally retarded 
offenders in the criminal justice system are the result of society 
trying to treat retardation as a mental illness.208 Penry himself ar-
gues that although mentally ill and mentally retarded individuals 
should be treated the same in that neither group should be death 
penalty eligible, the reasons for making such a rule are different 
because the disabilities are not alike. 209 It is therefore unlikely that 
the Court will see the need to broadly interpret Ford so as to include 
Penry's appeal. 
A. Summary of Ford v. Wainwright 
The Supreme Court in Ford v. Wainwright held that the exec-
ution of a defendant who is presently insane constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment under the eighth amendment.2lo Alvin Ford 
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. 211 At the time of 
trial, Ford showed no signs of incompetency, nor did he claim that 
at the time of the offense he was suffering from any impaired 
mental state.212 However, while awaiting his execution, Ford began 
to exhibit "paranoid schizophrenic" behavior which gradually wors-
ened.213 He developed an obsession with the Ku Klux Klan and 
believed that the prison guards were conspiring to take the inmates 
and others hostage. 214 He referred to himself as "Pope John Paul, 
111."215 His conduct ultimately degenerated to the point where he 
would only communicate in a "code characterized by intermittent 
207 Mentally retarded defendants who have used Ford as authority for their own capital 
punishment challenges have been summarily dismissed as stating a claim which has no legal 
merit. Martin v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp. 1523, 1573 (S.D. Fla. 1988). See Penry, 832 F.2d at 
918; Middleton, 368 S.E.2d at 461. Cf Brogdon, 824 F.2d at 341 (mentally retarded defendant 
had no authority for claiming that his execution was cruel and unusual). 
208 See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text. 
209 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 36-37. 
210 477 U.S. at 399. 
211 [d. at 401. 
212Id. at 401-02. 
213 [d. at 402. 
214Id. 
215 [d. 
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use of the word one."216 At a hearing to determine Ford's compe-
tency to be executed, three psychiatrists agreed that Ford had a 
significant mental illness, but yet could fully comprehend that he 
was being sentenced to death.217 Based on these findings, the trial 
court upheld the sentence.218 
The Supreme Court held that defendants may not be executed 
while they are insane.219 To support its holding, the Court relied 
on common law principles and an analysis of the deterrent and 
retributive value of executing defendants who presently suffer from 
a substantial mental illness. In examining common law, the Court 
found no "unanimity" of rationale why mentally ill defendants 
should not be executed, but found no authority that countenanced 
the punishment. 220 Particularly persuasive to the Court was the 
following passage from Blackstone's Commentaries: 
If, after [a man] be tried and found guilty, he loses his senses 
before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced; and if, 
after judgment, he becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall 
be stayed ... [for] he might have alleged something in stay of 
judgment or execution.221 
The Court concluded that mentally ill defendants, because of dis-
turbances in their thought processes, are not capable of compre-
hending why they are being "singled out and stripped of [their] 
fundamental right to life."222 Execution of a defendant who cannot 
"come to grips with his own conscience," therefore, does not con-
tribute to the community's need to offset a crime with a punishment 
of similar "moral quality."223 Without this retributive element, the 
execution of insane defendants amounts to the "barbarity of exact-
ing mindless vengeance" that is constitutionally prohibited.224 
B. Application of Ford to Mentally Retarded Defendants 
Interpretation of Ford has led courts to conclude that the in-
quiry into competence to be executed should not be limited to a 
2161d. at 403. 
2171d. at 404. 
2IBId. 
2191d. at 410. 
22°ld. at 408. 
2211d. at 407 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 24-25 (1769)). 
2221d. at 409. 
2231d. 
22<ld. at 409-10. 
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diagnosis of mental illness.225 "A condemned prisoner need not have 
all mental faculties; the prisoner need only appreciate the connec-
tion between the crime and its punishment."226 While the Ford stan-
dard does not encompass all mentally ill defendants, its use in the 
courts results in the exclusion of mentally retarded defendants.227 
Under the present system, mentally retarded defendants can only 
be excused from the full extent of punishment available at law if 
the sentence they receive reflects that the jury has considered their 
lower intelligence. This will be reflected in the jurors' response to 
the defendant's inability to appreciate the criminality of his acts or 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.228 A reduced 
sentence will result only if the jury has found these to be sufficient 
circumstances to mitigate against the imposition of the death pen-
alty. 
Application of the common law principles cited in Ford indicates 
that the Ford holding should include mentally retarded defendants. 
Blackstone's Commentaries state that "idiots and lunatics are not 
chargeable for their own acts, if committed when under these ca-
pacities."229 "Idiot" here refers to a label once used for the mentally 
retarded. Although Penry classifies as an "idiot" according to Black-
stone, he seeks a different holding than Ford. Ford addresses a 
defendant's competency to be executed. Penry, however, wants the 
Court to declare that his mental retardation rendered him incapable 
of acting with the requisite culpability to justify a death sentence.230 
If Ford were to apply to culpability issues, the mentally ill and 
the mentally retarded should not be conveniently grouped. Mental 
retardation is not a form of mental illness, as petitioner in Penry 
points OUt.231 Although Penry agrees that neither insane nor men-
tally retarded defendants should be executed, the reasons for this 
claim are different because the two are "different phenomena."232 
An insane person should not be executed because "[he] is so out of 
touch with reality that he is not aware of why he is being exe-
225 Martin, 686 F. Supp. at 1572-73. See State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889, 913 (Wash. 1988). 
Cf U.S. v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 858, 859 (N.D. Cal. 1975) ("severe mental illness, even if 
sufficient to exculpate the defendant if found to exist at the time of the offense, would not 
necessarily render the defendant incompetent to stand trial"). 
226 Martin, 686 F. Supp. at 1572-73. 
227 See supra note 207. 
228 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
229 Ford, 477 U.S. at 406 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at 24-25 (1769». 
230 Brief for Respondent, supra note 32, at 38-39. 
2'l Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 36. 
232 [d. at 37. 
1989] MENTALLY RETARDED DEFENDANTS 357 
cuted."233 A mentally retarded person, on the other hand, is aware 
of the circumstances, yet should not be held fully accountable for 
his crime because of a deficit in adaptive behavior.234 Although 
mentally retarded individuals, particularly those in the less severe 
range of disability, are generally not so out of touch with reality 
that they do not know what is going on around them, their deficit 
in adaptive behavior reduces their ability to understand the impli-
cations of their functioning in the real world to a simpler level than 
an average adult. 235 
Amici contend that because of their impaired ability to under-
stand causation and consequences, mentally retarded defendants 
lack the culpability that is an essential element of retribution.236 
Without this element of moral culpability, imposition of the death 
penalty does not reflect the necessary relationship between a defen-
dant's punishment and his blameworthiness. 237 Despite the fact that 
the level of retardation and therefore the effects of the disability 
will vary among individuals, Amici contend that every mentally 
retarded defendant is incapable of acting with the degree of culp-
ability which justifies imposition of the death penalty.238 Amici claim 
that even the mentally retarded individual at the lowest level of 
disability still has a substantial deficit in adaptive behavior compared 
to a person of average intelligence. 239 
This is particularly difficult for a jury to comprehend, partic-
ularly when the defendant is classified as mildly retarded. It may 
be difficult for the untrained observer to distinguish between "bor-
derline" individuals and mildly retarded persons. 240 Borderline in-
dividuals are not formally classified as retarded, although they do 
have lower than average intelligences that should be used in miti-
gation.24 I However, if an exclusion for all mentally retarded defen-
dants, even the mildly retarded, is granted, it would appear unfair 
to a jury to deny a Ford application to borderline individuals. 
233 Id. 
234Id. 
235Id. at 44. 
236 Amici, supra note II, at 7. 
237 Id. at 12. 
238Id. at 13. 
239Id. at 15. 
240 The category of borderline retardation had been used to describe individuals whose 
IQs fell in the 68-83 range, but the profession has since abandoned the classification. See 
Ellis, supra note 13, at 422 n.44. 
241 Amici, supra note II, at 5-6 n.2. 
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The most compelling reason for not extending the Ford rule to 
encompass mentally retarded defendants is the fact that mental 
illness and mental retardation are not the same type of defect. 242 
The mentally ill suffer from an illness that temporarily disturbs 
thought processes.243 Mentally retarded individuals, however, have 
a permanently impaired ability to learn.244 Mental retardation is 
defined as a "significantly subaverage general intellectual function-
ing existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and 
manifested during the developmental period."245 
Whereas mentally retarded defendants are not so readily iden-
tifiable,246 mentally ill defendants, due to the nature of their illness, 
are often removed from the proceedings on the basis of incompet-
ence. Yet even if found competent to stand trial, mentally ill defen-
dants have access to the insanity defense.247 This defense reduces 
their culpability by removing mentally ill offenders from the sen-
tencing proceedings altogether.248 The insanity defense has gener-
ally not been available to mentally retarded defendants because 
retardation has not met the legal requirements for "insanity" despite 
its effect on the mental state of the defendant.249 
Some states have defined insanity on the basis of the offender's 
ability to distinguish right from wrong, which is referred to as the 
M'Naghten rule. 250 The M'Naghten rule limits use of the insanity 
defense to those defendants who, at the time the crime was com-
mitted, did not know that what they were doing was wrong.251 This 
standard, as interpreted by the courts, effectively bars the mentally 
retarded defendant from invoking the insanity defense. In Brogdon 
v. Butler, the court held that "mental retardation does not constitute 
insanity or the incapacity to know the difference between right and 
242 Supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text. 
243 Ellis, supra note 13, at 423-24. 
244 ld. at 424. 
245 AAMD, cited in Ellis, supra note 13, at 421. 
246 Supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text. 
247 Under the insanity defense, the defendant admits the commission of the crime but 
shifts responsibility for it from himself to the disease or defect which prevents him from 
being classified as a criminal acting with the full extent of punishable culpability. Weiner, 
supra note 85, at 707. 
248 A judgment of incompetency to stand trial results in the institutionalization of the 
defendant until sane. See statutes listed supra notes 102-03. 
249 This is a result of the failure to distinguish between legal and medical sanity. See infra 
notes 114-15 and accompanying text. 
250 Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843), discussed in Weiner, supra 
note 85, at 709. 
251ld. 
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wrong. It is only the latter disability, not the former, that serves as 
a defense to conviction and also to punishment."252 
In refusing to extend the holding in Ford to mentally retarded 
defendants, courts may be assuming that since the "irrationality, 
paranoia, and delusions that can indicate mental illness and are 
related to criminality are not indicators of mental retardation,"253 a 
mentally retarded person would know the difference between right 
and wrong. Amici reject this rationale. According to Amici, mentally 
retarded offenders have a limited ability to reach the full moral 
reasoning ability of the average adult because of impaired intellec-
tual functioning and adaptive behavior.254 This impaired moral de-
velopment would almost certainly manifest itself in a limited ability 
to distinguish between right and wrong,255 and may even result in 
an inability to learn from past mistakes.256 
The M'Naghten rule has been criticized for being too narrow, 
thereby denying access to the defense to those, like the mentally 
retarded, who should be eligible.257 In an attempt to remedy this 
inequity, more than half the states have adopted the test for culp-
ability proposed by the American Law Institute.258 Under the ALI 
standard, defendants can use their mental state as a defense if, "as 
a result of mental disease or defect [they] lack substantial capacity 
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of [their] conduct 
or conform [their] conduct to the requirements of law."259 
This standard is better suited to serve the mentally retarded 
defendant, for "mental defect" encompasses mental retardation. 260 
However, application of the standard to mentally retarded defen-
dants illustrates the benefits of a case by case determination of 
culpability rather than a blanket exclusion for all disabled offenders. 
The ALI's use of the word "appreciate" instead of "know"261 allows 
the factfinder to evaluate the extent and effect of the disability on 
the offender, which brings up the problem of degree of retardation 
252 824 F.2d at 341. 
253 Ellis, supra note 13, at 427. 
254 Amici, supra note II, at 8. 
255Id. 
256Id. at 7. Penry suggests that the inability to learn from past mistakes is a better test 
to determine whether the defendant should be held culpable. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 
3, at 37. 
257 Weiner, supra note 85, at 710. 
258 Supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
259 Model Penal Code § 4.01 (1985). 
260 Ellis, supra note 13, at 437. 
261 Weiner, supra note 85, at 711-12. 
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and how it differs from the average adult. If this lack of apprecia-
tion does not manifest itself in some physically identifiable handicap, 
the jury in most instances will not consider it. 262 
Only one state263 has recognized that mental retardation, like 
mental illness, diminishes a defendant's responsibility for criminal 
conduct. Georgia has recently amended its insanity statute to en-
compass a defendant who pleads or is found guilty by jury verdict 
but who is also mentally retarded.264 The statute thereby denies 
imposition of the death penalty on a mentally retarded defendant. 
Although it indicates recognition of the decreased culpability of 
mentally retarded defendants, it is unlikely that this factor alone 
will indicate to the Supreme Court in Penry that there is a societal 
consensus against executing mentally retarded defendants. 
Public sentiment, particularly amongst the legal community, 
indicates some reluctance to expand the exclusion. First, lawyers do 
not want to be "burdened with an alternative set of rules" for 
mentally retarded defendants.265 Some lawyers, particularly prose-
cutors, find no flaws in the current laws.266 Others believe that 
making low intelligence and an inability to adapt to society's rules 
an exception would signal a complete breakdown of the criminal 
justice system, giving "license [to] every illiterate moron to violate 
the law with impunity."267 Second, opposition should be expected 
due to society's suspicion that mental illness can be easily feigned, 
and its reluctance to allow any excuse that would subvert commonly 
held social values, such as punishment of those who commit 
wrongs.268 There may be more convincing evidence that society 
condones the fact that mentally retarded defendants do receive 
punishment as a jury sees fit under the consideration of mitigating 
factors. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court will decide this term if execution of a 
mentally retarded defendant is cruel and unusual punishment un-
262 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
263 However, the Texas legislature is currently considering an amendment to its insanity 
statute. At the time of this writing, the bill has been sent to Committee. H.R. 55, 71st Texas 
Leg., 1988 (authored by Rep. Bob Melton). 
264 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-1310) (Supp. 1988). 
265 Manna, Crimes of Innocence, Student Law., Oct. 1980, at 24, 27. 
266 Reid, supra note 62, at 21-22. 
267 Manna, supra note 265, at 26. 
268 Perlin, The Supreme Court and the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant: Recent Develop-
ments, 15 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 391,401 (1987). 
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der the eighth amendment of the Constitution. Petitioner contends 
that such a holding is necessary and appropriate. Penry argues that 
the procedural safeguards within the criminal justice system are not 
operating to shield the less culpable mentally retarded individual 
from the full extent of criminal liability. Yet, such a rule would be 
contrary to the longstanding history of the criminal procedures used 
in our justice system. Although execution of this appealing group 
of defendants may raise dissent in the community, it is equally true 
that exclusion of this group of defendants would create inefficiency 
within the system and would work against the individualized ad-
ministration of justice. 
The Supreme Court could elect to decide Penry on other 
grounds, a tactic it has already used in deciding the constitutionality 
of executing juveniles presented in Eddings v. Oklahoma. Penry con-
tends that the sentencing procedure in his case did not allow the 
jury to act upon the mitigating evidence presented as to diminish 
defendant's culpability. If the Court agrees, it will have no need to 
determine the broader eighth amendment issue. If the Court does 
find that the jury was given adequate opportunity to grant mercy 
to this defendant and chose not to despite the ample evidence of 
mitigating circumstances, it will be necessary to determine if this is 
a punishment that is constitutionally prohibited. 
To assist in their determination, the Supreme Court could look 
to its past decisions. Their recent decision in Thompson v. Oklahoma 
will be helpful because of the similarities that have been recognized 
between mentally retarded individuals and juveniles. However, the 
Court's holding in Thompson did not reflect an attitude that all 
juveniles, regardless of age or relative maturity, should be ineligible 
for death penalty imposition. The Court, in tandem with Penry, will 
hear cases involving sixteen and seventeen year-old defendants. If 
the Court finds in favor of the defendants in State v. Wilkins and 
High v. Zant on the basis of their age, the Court may extend the 
exemption to mentally retarded defendants because of their mental 
age. However, the Court did not indicate a willingness either to 
expand the Thompson holding or to accept a juvenile comparison. 
In fact, through Justice O'Connor's opinion, there is some indica-
tion that the Court would be hesitant to rule in favor of any other 
appealing group, even those defendants with lower than average 
intelligence. 
The Court could likewise decide to expand its Ford v. Wainwright 
decision to encompass mentally retarded defendants. However, de-
spite the fact that the professional community deems these two 
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disabilities as comparable in a capital punishment sense, no court 
has applied the Ford holding to anyone but a mentally ill defendant. 
Based on public opinion which shows a mistrust of the use of mental 
illness as a defense, it is unlikely that the Court would make an 
unpopular rule even more controversial by expanding its applica-
tion to accommodate other mental disabilities, including mental 
retardation. 
Nancy L. Woodhouse 
